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1 . Introduction 
Jn a private market economy in which business firms seek to maximize profits, racial 
discrimination in the workplace makes no economic sense. Why? Because it is costly. When an 
employer hires or pays wages on the basis of race rather than productivity, the outcome is 
inefficient and profits are sacrificed. Why, then, would a profit-driven firm ever knowingly trade 
off profits in order to p ractice racial discrimination? Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, in his Ph.D. 
dissertation (1957) and in a later book in which he refined and extended his disset1ation research 
( 1971 ), provides a si mplc but pow·erful answer. Racial discrimination is preference-based and 
utility-maximizing. If an employer has a preference (i .e., taste) for discrimination, then the 
ability ro act on this preference increases the employer's utility. 
For over 30 years now empirical research on racial discrimination in the workplace has 
been defined by, and focused on, Becker's insight The literature is now extensive, highly 
technical, and to some extent fragmented-as groups of analysts have concentrated on different 
aspects of the problem. This p<:�per is intended to be a "primer" on this work for the non­
specialist who \vants to get up to speed on, or possibly begin contributing to, this line of research. 
In what follows, therefore, I highlight some of the important articles, key methodological 
advances, and central results that have been obtained to date. More specifically, in the rest of this 
section I lay out Becker's theory of discrimination and its central predictions. In Section 2 I 
introduce the reader, in a nontechnical way, to the scope of the research effort that has developed 
in the wake of Becker's work. I then turn, in Section 3, to studies of racial employment patterns 
in the airline and trucking industries and highlight the contributions of these studies to our 
understanding of discrimination in the workplace. Multi-industry studies of discrimination in the 
setting of wage rates are the focus of Section 4. In conclusion I ol1er some comments on what 
ViC have learned to date, and where do we go from here. 
Becker's theory can be understood in a "principal-agent" context. Suppose that the 
principal-a business owner, or a group of owners such as shareholders-has incomplete 
information concerning the operations o f  the firm. This provides the agent-the business 
manager-with the opportunity to maximize his/her own utility by engaging in discretionary 
behavior. If the manager acts on this opportunity, and i f  the manager has a preference for 
discrimination, then the manager will seek to exercise this preference. But doing so results in a 
m?mnrmmar·ar=r=rm § •.• ,, 
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loss of profits for the firm. So, the key question is this: Under \Vhat circumstances is a manager 
actually able to indul ge his/her taste for discrimination? Becker's answer is straightforward: 
When the firm is in a non-competitive industry and therefore earning excess profits. It is these 
excess profits tbat enable the firm to absorb the inefliciency associated with discrimination and 
continue to earn profits for the owner(s). 
This conjecture leads directly to what I will call the "Basic Becker Hypothesis": Racial 
discrimination in the v..-orkplace will be more pronounced in non-competitive industries than in 
competitive industries. Enhanced competition in product markets, therefore, should lead to less 
racial discrimination in the workplace. Now, does this mean that Becker thinks (or argues) that 
the preference for discrimination is a positive function of product market concentration? No. 
Becker's point is that the ability to exercise a given preference for discrimination is positively 
correlated \'-iith product market concentration. Firms with monopoly power are not inherently 
more discriminatory than firms in competitive industries . They simply have more of an ability­
thanks to the existence of excess profits-to act on their preferences. Firms .in competitive 
industries do not engage in less racial discrimination in the workplace because they are more 
''virtuous" in this regard, but rather because they can't. Under intense pressure to manage costs, 
and without excess profits to expend on costly indulgences, such firms cannot afford to practice 
racial discrimination. 
2. 30 Years of Empirical Testing: A Non-technical Introduction 
Empirical research on the extent to which the Basic Becker Hypothesis explains patterns 
of racial discrimination in the workplace has taken 1\VO approaches. Some analysts focus on the 
relationship between "Employment Discrimination" and market structure, by asking the 
following questions : Is minority employment inversely correlated with product market 
concentration? Does enhanced competition in an industry lead to increased employment 
opp011unities for minorities? [n general, are racial hiring patterns influenced by product market 
structure? Other economists train their sights on the relationship between "Earnings 
Discrimination" and market structure . The key questions asked in these studies are: Is the 
black/white wage gap, for similar workers in similar occupations, positive ly correlated with 
product market concentration? Does enhanced competition in an industry result in smaller racial 
v.•age gaps? More generally, are minority wages and salaries a function of product marke1 
structure? 
In the 1970's, during the years immediately following the publication of the second 
edition of Becker' s The Eronomics of Discrimination (1971 ), a flurry of empirical studies 
attempted to test the Basic Becker Hypothesis in a multi-industry context. The results were 
mixed. The issue of Employment Discrimination \Vas tackled by Comanor (I 973), Shepherd & 
Levin (1973), and Hacssel & Palmer (1978), who focused on the relationship between the racia[ 
composition of employment and product market concentration. A later reviewer or these studies 
(Heywood, in a 1987 paper otherwise focused on Earnings Discrimination) concluded that they 
found a "moderate" or "reasonable" level of support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis. But the 
two major studies done on Earnings Discrimination-Fujii & Trapani (1978) and Johnson ( 1978)­
found no clear connection between product market concentration and minority wages. 
Then, a wave of Deregulation swept through U.S. industry in the late 1970's and early 
1980's. From 1976 to 1984, the U.S. Government loosened its grip on the trucking, railroad, 
airline, and telecommunications industries by deregulating ( 1 )  entry into and exit from markets 
and (2) prices and rate-setting. The goal of these regulatory reforms was to promote competition 
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by allowing private market forces to play a greater role in determining prices, proftts, and entry 
into markets. Economists were thus given a golden opportunity to test the Basic Becker 
Hypothesis : Researchers now had the chance to study Deregulation's effect on racial hiring 
patterns and racial wage differentials in a single industry over time . 
'vVork on the relationship between Deregulation and Earnings Discrimination began with 
Rose ( 1987). I-ler findings, along with those obtained by Heywood ( 1998), Peoples & Saunders 
(1993), and Peoples & R obinson (1996), reveal strong support for the Basic Becker Hypo thesis. 
When Deregulation generates enhanced competition in an industry, racial wage gaps get smaller. 
Deregulation's effect on Employment Discrimination will be discussed later, in Section 3, where 
I h igh ligh t the work of Agesa (200 I) o n  racial employment patterns in the airline industry and 
compare her rcsulls with those obtained in studies of the trucking industry. 
Empirical work on the relationship between product market structure and racial 
discri m ination in the workplace, up to the present, has heen sustained and driven by three key 
factors. First, improvements in data collection have enabled researchers to construct more useful 
and appropriate data sets. In particular, during the 1980's it became possible for researchers to 
match up workers more accurately with concentrated and unconcentrated industries. Second , 
advances in econometric techniques have made i t  possible to examine the market 
structure/discrimination connection more carefully and correctly. Researchers now have a good 
understanding of the control variables, dummy variables, and interaction terms necessary to 
identify and highlight the differential impact of market structure on white and black workers. 
More generally, economists now have more of an understanding of, and an ability to correct for, 
specification error-especially in wage equations . 
Third, the results that have been obtained over the years continue to stim ulate thinking, 
both empirical and theoretical, on the nature of racial discrimination in the workplace. Recent 
work has uncovered three features of the labor-market context that qualify the Basic Becker 
Hypothesis in impo11ant respects: Unionization, job-skill level, and labor supply constraints at 
various skill levels. Taken together, these resutts have not caused researchers to reject the Basic 
Becker Hypothesis, but rather to develop a more nuanced, context-specific view of the 
relationsh ip between product market concentration and racial discrimination in the •vorkplace. 
Beginning with Peoples (!994), research on the efiects ofunionization has shown that the 
behavior of labor unions alters the relationship betv.'cen market structure and Earnings 
Discrimination. The focus of unions on negotiating standardized wages for their members-what 
J will call the "union \vage-standardization effect"-appears to offset the inOuence of product 
market concentration on racial wage gaps in a variety of settings. At present, some analysts (e.g., 
Agcsa & Agesa, 2007 forthcoming) are exploring the empirical limits, or reach, of the union 
wage-standardization effect-in terms of its ability to prevent Earnings Discrimination across 
different occupational c ategories in unionized , concentrated industries. 
The question of how job-skill levels influence the market structure/discrimination 
relationship has Icc! to an expl icit theoretical extension of the Basic Becker H ypothesis, which 
has provided the impetus lor continued empirical research. The so-called "Skill Based 
Hypothesis," developed in Heywood & P eoples (1994), states that the form which racial 
discrimination in a profitable non-competitive industry takes (i.e., Employmen t or Earnings 
Discrimination) is a function of the skill level of workers. For black lov.·-skill workers who 
supply their talents elastically to an industry, discrimination will be employment-based rather 
than earnings-based. Black high-skill workers, who supply their labor inelastically to an 
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industry, will face a greater earnings gap as a result of product market concentration, but will 
experience little or no Employment Discrimination. The following simple supply and demand 
analysis highlights, intuitively, the nature of this argument. 
Figures I and 2 below highlight the interaction between the supply of and demand for 
labor in a pmticular industry. Suppose that all workers, black and white, arc identical in terms of 
skills and productivity. In Figure I the workers are low-skilled and easily replaced, so the supply 
of labor overall (St.) is perfectly elastic. In the absence of discrimination total employment wiU 
be E * and the wage rate will be W*, as determined by the intersection of SL and Dt.. For 
illustrative purposes only, asswn.e an equal amount of white and black employment (Ew,B) so that 
Ew,B is one-half of E*. Suppose no\:v that this indust1y is non-competitive and that firms earn 
excess profits. If employers have a preference for discrimination and act on it, and if overall 
employment remains constant, then the resuH will be a decline in black employment coupled 
with an increase in white employment. This can be thought of as a bifurcation of labor demand: 
al any given wage rate the demand for black labor (DBL) will be less than the demand for white 
labor (Dwt} As a result, Es + Ew = E* and W* remains unaffected. 
In Figure 2 the workers arc high-skilled and the overall supply of labor (SL) is perfectly 
inelastic. In the absence of discrimination total employment will be E* and the wage rate will be 
W*, as determined by the intersection of SL and Dt.. Assume once again an equal amount or 
white and black employment at E*. If this industry is non-competitive, firms earn excess profits, 
and employers act on a preference for discrimination, the result will be a decline in black \�'ages 
relative to white wages. A racial wage gap equal to (\Vw- WB) will be created by Lhe bifurcation 
of labor demand into the demand for black labor (DBL) and the demand for white labor (OwL). 
But Employment Discrimination will not be present. 
Figure I 
Ee Ew.u Ew E• 
Figure 2 
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Single-industry and multi-industry tests of the Skill Based Hypothesis (Heywood & 
Peoples , 1994; /\gesa & Monaco, 2004) confirm the predicted Employment Discrimination 
effects: the employment of black low-skill workers is indeed negatively correlated with a lack of 
competition in product markets, whereas the employment of black high-skill workers appears to 
be umelated to the extent of product market concentration. A recent multi-industry study of the 
Earnings Discrimination implications of the Skill Based Hypothesis, however, finds that both 
unionization and black labor-supply constraints at higher skill levels influence the actual 
relationship between job-skill level and the racial wage gap in concentrated industries (Agesa & 
Monaco, 2006). 
3. Single-Industry Studies of Employment Discrimination: 
Lessons from Airlines and Trucking 
Studies of Deregulation 's effect on Employment Discrimination in the for-hire segment 
of the trucking industry include Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Agesa (1998). The major case 
study of Deregulation and Employment Discrimination in the air line industry is Agcsa (2001). In 
this section I review Agesa {2001) in some detail. By comparing and contrasting her results with 
those obtained in the trucking studies, I highlight two key factors that influence Deregulation's 
effect on racial employment patterns . 
Deregulation began in the airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 
which suspended minimum pricing policies. In J 981, entry restrictions were removed. Agesa 
(2001) studies these reforms' effects on racial employment patterns in five airline occupations: 
managers, pilots, mechanics, ticket agents, and flight attendants. A l l  data on these occupations, 
covering the period J 973 - 1996, were obtained from Current Population Survey documents . 
Agesa tests a specific formulation of the Basic Becker Hypothesis: Deregulation will 
reduce the industry's abi lity to exercise a given preference for racial discrimination in hiring, and 
minority (non-white) employment will rise. The argument proceeds as follows. During the 
period of Regulation ( from the 1930's up to the Airline Deregulation Act) entry and exit 
restrictions were in place, along with fare controls. The government also controlled merger 
activit-y within the industry. This regulatory regime, presumably, reduced the level of 
competition among carriers. This lack of competition , i n  turn, may have resulted in excess 
profits�which would have given employers the ability to exercise a preference for racia l 
discrimination in employment. Deregulating the industry, and hence promoting increased 
competition among (existing and nevv) carriers, should lead to a decline in the level of 
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Employment Discrimination. 
To test this argument, Agesa asks three specific questions. First: How did airline 
deregulation influence racial employment in each of the five airline occupations, relative to racial 
employment in an economy-wide comparison group containing all non-agricultural/non-airline 
\vorkers in similar occupations? To ans\ver this question Agesa uses dummy variables in her 
regressions to identify, for both the Pre-deregulation period (1973-78) and the Post-deregulation 
period (1979-96), the racial employment gap Cor each airline occupation: the difference between 
the racial employment pattern in that occupation and the racial employment pattern in thar 
occupation's nation-wide comparison group. Agesa then includes a term capturing the 
interaction beLw·een racial employment in the airline industry and Deregulation. This variable 
reveals the difference betv�'ccn the racial employment gap in each occupation during 1973-78 arnd 
the racial employment gap in each occupation during 1979-96. If the Basic Becker Hypothesis is 
true, the coefficient on this interaction term-for each airline occupation-should be significant. 
Specifically, the racial employment gaps should decrease as a result of Deregulation. 
The second question Agesa focuses on is: Were the changes in racial employment in each 
of thc five airline occupations, over tbe entire period 1973-1996, the result ofDeregulation, or of 
nation-\vide trends in racial employment? Finally, Agesa asks: What was the size of the ''racial 
employment gap" between each airline occupation and its national comparison group over the 
entire sample period, at each two-to-three year interval? Answering these questions required 1\vo 
additional regression specifications. 
Agesa's findings, on the surface, do not support the Basic Becker Hypothesis. The 
coefficient on the key interaction term in her first regression specification was small and 
insignificant for all five occupations, indicating that Deregulation had little or no influence on 
any of the racial employment gaps. With respect to the second question, in four of the five 
airline occupations (all except flight attendants) the changes that occurred in racial employment 
over the entire sample period can be attributed to the changes in racial employment that occurred 
in similar occupations nation-wide. FinaUy, Agesa's third specification yields no strong evidence 
of Employment Discrimination in the airline industry, either before or after Deregulation. In 
sum, it appears as if the Basic Becker Hypothesis, in this particular context, should be rejected. 
The studies of Deregulation's effect on racial employment in trucking generated a very 
different set of results. Trucking, like the airline industry, began to be deregulated in 1978. In 
1980 the Motor Carrier Act completed the process. In the aftermath of these reforms the industry 
experienced a huge increase in the number of caniers. Total employment exploded, and the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters lost quite a bit of control over the industr�y labor supp1y 
(Peoples, 1998). Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Agesa (1998) found, moreover, that minority 
employment increased significantly as a result of Deregulation. In contrast to what happened in 
the airline industry, Deregulation in trucking led directly to a redut.:tion in the level of 
Employment Discrimination. 
Why were such different results obtained for trucking and airlines? As Agcsa (200 1) 
points out, two key insights enable LIS to understand, and reconcile, the observed correlation 
between Deregulation and racial employment patterns in each industry. First, the Basic Becker 
Hypothesis predicts that the level of racial discrimination in an industry is not ini1uenced by 
Deregulation in and of itself, but rather by the change in product market structure that results 
from Deregulation. Trucking is a naturally competitive industry Yvith low barriers Lo enlry 
(Hirsch & Macpherson, 1998; Peoples, 1998). Deregulating trucking, therefore, transformed the 
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structure of this industry. Prior to Deregulation trucking was a sheltered, protecled, non­
competitive industry. In the wake of the 1978 and 1980 regulatory reforms, life as a provider of 
trucking services changed entirely: competition for business became, and has remained, fierce. 
Deregulating the airline industry, however, did not change the competitive nature of the 
business. A lthough carriers did not engage in price competition under Regulation, they did 
compete with each other along non-price service-oriented dimensions (Peoples, 1998). Airlines 
fought for business by adjusting their flight schedules, Hying different types of aircraft, offering 
varied seating arrangements and options, and providing other passenger amenities. Deregulation 
merely shifted the focus of competition to pricing . Carriers, in sum, competed with each other 
fiercely (albeit in different ways) both before and after Deregulation. Employers in the airline 
industry had little if any ability-throughout the sample period 1973-1996-to indulge a costly 
preference for racial discrimination in hiring. 
Second, as Agesa (200 1) points out, there is a significant difference bet\veen trucking and 
airlines in terms of the general skill level of employees. In trucking, low-skill \Vorkers 
predominate. During the early to mid-1970's 51% of employees in trucking v .. ue in low-skill 
occupational categories such as "operators" and "laborers," whereas only 17% of employees were 
in high-skill occupational categories (Agcsa, 2001). The supply of labor to the trucking industry 
can thus be considered as relatively elastic: most workers are easily replaced, and the needed 
skills can be quickly acquired on the job or with a little bit of training. Airline employment, in 
contrast, is concentrated in high-ski 11 occupational categories. According to Agesa (200 1 ), 
during the 1973-78 Pre-deregulation period the majority of airline employees were in high-skill 
occupntions, with only 8% of employees classified as low-skill "operators" or "laborers." 
Jn light of these two features of the trucking and airlines industries, the Basic Becker 
Hypothesis predicts that Deregulation should result in (1) no change in the level of racial 
discrimination in the airline industry, and {2) a drop in the level of racial discrimination in 
trucking. More specifically, the Skill Based Hypothesis laid out in Section 2 predicts that 
Deregulation should result in (1)  little or no change in racial employment patterns in the airline 
industry, and (2) a decline in the amount of Employment Discrimination in trucking. 
The results obtained by Agesa (2001) for airlines, and by Heywood & Peoples (1994) and 
Agesa (1998) for trucking, match these predictions. These single-industry case studies of the 
relationship between Deregu lation and Employment Discrimination thus provide support for the 
Basic Becker Hypothesis and its skill-based extension-Dnce the product market consequences of 
Deregulation, and the occupational structure of each industry, are taken into account and 
incorporated into the analysis. 
4. Multi-Industry Studies of Earnings Discrimination: 
Key Contributions and Results 
Three important multi-industry studies of the relationship between product market 
concentration and the racial \Vage gap are Heywood (1987}, Peoples (1994), and Agcsa & 
Monaco (2006). ln this section I highlight the contributions these articles make to the literature, 
and summarize what they uncover about the forces driving Earnings Discrimination in the 
workplace. 
Heywood ( 1987) tests the relationship between Earnings Discrimination and 
concentration in U.S. manufacturing, using data t1·om the 1981 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
His study improves upon the earlier work of Johnson (1978) and Fujii & Trapani (1978) in two 
important respects. first, Heywood is the beneficiary of a significant i mprovement in data 
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collection. Prior to 1 980, industries vvere di saggregated i n  the needed data sets (e.g., the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics) to only the t\.vo-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) level. 
This level of aggregation prevented Johnson and Fuji i  & Trapani from identii)'ing the true pattern 
of product market concentration in manufacturing, and from matching up workers accurntely 
\vith concentrated and unconcentrated indmtries. Starting in 1 980 narrower three-di git SIC 
industrial definitions were incorporated into the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and other 
needed data sets. This gave Heywood the opportunity to capture, much more ful!y, the reality of 
product market concentration i n  U . S .  manufacturing. H e  was also able, as a result, to map 
workers into con centrated and unconcentrated industries more accurately than J ohnson and Fl�j i i  
& Trapani \Vere able t o  do.  
Second, Heywood addressed several key sources of specification error present i n  Johnson 
and Fuj i i  & Trapani ,  by i nclud i ng several new independent variables in his wage equati on . For 
example, Heyw·ood included the four-firm Concentration Ratio itself as an i ndependent variable, 
arguing that the failure of the earlier studies to do this could well have obscured or distorted the 
true effect of concentration , by itself� on the racial wage gap. Heywood also i ncluded ::1 dummy 
variable for union status. Unions influence wages, and the Basic Becker Hypothesis slates that 
concentration affects minority wages. But un ionization and concentration arc highly correlated. 
Union status, therefore , must be controlled for in the wage equation. Most imponantly, 
Heywood includes a dummy variable for black \Vorkcrs and a term capturing the interaction 
between black worker status and product market concentration. If the Basic Becker Hypothesis 
is true then the coefficient on this interaction term is negative : concentration, by itself, depresses 
black vvagcs relative to white wages, resulting in a bigger racial wage gap in concentrated 
industries than i n  unconcentrated i ndustries . 
Heywood found that the coefficient on the race-concentration interaction term-under a 
variety of speci fications-was indeed negative and s ignificant. Hcyvvood' s  results thus reveal 
strong support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis : Lhe black/white wage gap in U . S .  manufacturing 
does appear to be positively correlated with product market concentration. 
Peoples ( 1 994) extends Heywood's w·ork by studying the extent to which unionization 
affects the re lati onship between product market concentration and the racial \:vage gap. Since 
unions are motivated to standardize wages (Freeman, 1 9 80), Peoples argttes that the effect of 
concentration on the racial wage gap may \Yell be smaller in unionized i ndustries than in non­
unionized industries. How did Peoples test this hypothesis? By estimating separate wage 
equations for union and non-union workers. Heywood, as noted earlier, did incorporate a union 
status control i n  his  wage equation. But such a variable, by itself, i s  not enough to i solate and 
h igh l ight the di1Terential impact o f  union status on the racial wage gap . Peoples ' work, therefore, 
represents the first ful l  account ing, in the literature on Earnings Discrimination and market 
structure, of the eftects of unionization on the racial wage gap. 
Peoples' results support h i s  argument. I n  the non-union sector, the racial wage gap is  
indeed a positive function of product market concentration. But in the union sector the racial 
wage gap is unaffected by the extent o f  product market concentration. Peoples interprets this 
result as follows: The "union wage-standardization effect" prevents employers in unionized 
industries from acting more ful l y  on their preference for racial discrimination as product market 
concentrmion increases. Unions, in other words, appear to protect black workers from managers 
in concentrated industries who otherwise would have more of an ab i l i ty to i ndul ge a taste for 
Earnings Discrimination than their counterparts in unconcentrated industries . 
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Peoples ( 1 994) shows, in sum, that the support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis found by 
Heywood ( 1 987) is limited to the non-union sector. Future work on the relationship between 
product market structure and Earnings Discrimination, therefore, must account fully for the 
impact of unionization. 
Agcsa & Monaco (2006) extend the work of Peoples ( 1 994) and I-Ieyvmod ( 1 987) b:y 
testing the Earnings Discrimination implications of the Skill Based Hypothesis. Recall that this 
extension of the B asic Becker Hypothesis predicts that the racial wage gap in concentrated 
industries will increase along with the job-skill level: blacks in high-skilled occupations \Vill face 
more Earnings Discrimination than blacks in lower-skilled occupations. 
Age sa & Monaco test this prediction using data from the 1 99 1 - 1 996 issues of the CuJTent 
Population Survey and the 1 992 Census of Manufacturers. Following Heywood ( 1 987), they 
match up vmrkers with concentrated and unconcentrated industries using three-digit SIC 
industrial definitions. 'fhey also include as independent variables the four-firm Concentration 
Ratio, a dummy variable for black workers, and a race-concentration interaction term that reveals 
the extent to \Vhich product market concentration depresses black wages relative to white wages. 
Following Peoples ( 1 994), Agesa & Monaco estimate separate wage equations for union and 
non-union workers, to capture and highlight the unique impact of unionization on the racial wage 
gap. Where Age sa & Monaco go beyond both Heywood ( 1 987) and Peoples ( 1 994) is in the use 
of Quantile Regression. This technique allows them to estimate racial wage gaps across the 
spectrum of j ob-skill levels, rather than simply the average wage gap faced by all black workers 
in concentrated industries and the average wage gap faced by all black workers in unconcentrated 
industries. 
Agesa & Monaco report three important results. First, they find no correlation between 
the racial wage gap and product market concentration-at any skill level-in unionized industries. 
This confirms the work of Peoples ( 1 994 ): the "union wage-standardization effect" does indeed 
protect black workers in unionized industries. Second, Agesa & Monaco find no evidence that 
concentration increases the racial wage gap for high-skill blacks, regardless of their union status. 
In fact, across all concentrated industries the racial wage gap shrinks dramatically as the j ob-skill 
level rises. Agesa & Monaco offer the following interpretation. In the C P S  data there is a 
negative correlation between the prevalence of black employment and j ob-skill level: black 
employment is relatively high in low-skill occupations, and falls off sharply as the job-skill level 
increases. If this correlation is a labor-supply phenomenon, then the limited supply of high-skill 
black workers, union and non-union alike, is protecting these \Vorkers from increased Earnings 
Discrimination in concentrated industries. Black labor-supply constraints at higher skill level'), 
in other \Vords, may be driving the observed pattern of racial wage gaps in concentrated 
industries. 
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Finally, Agesa & Monaco discover that in the non-union sector the racial \:vagc gap is 
positively correlated with product market concentration-for low-skilled and medium-ski l led 
occupations only. This indicates that the support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis found by 
Peoples ( 1 9 94) in  the non-union sector is driven by the increased Earnings Discrimination faced 
by low- and medium-skill black workers. 
Taken together, the results obtained by Heywood (! 987), Peoples ( J 994 ), and Ages a & 
Monaco (2006) do not i nd icate that the Basic Becker Hypothesis should be rejected. Rather, they 
point to three key features of the labor-market context that in11uence the underlying relationship 
bctvl'·cen product market concentration and Earnings D iscrimination: Unionization, job-skill 
level, and a limited supply of high-sk i l l  blacks. In cases where black workers arc not protected 
by union membership or by advanced education and training, they appear to be at the mercy of 
employers in concentrated industries who seek to exercise a preference for racial discrimination 
in the setting of wage rates. 
5. Conclusion 
More than 30 years after the publication of The Economics of Di scrimi natino in 1 97 L ,  
Becker's theory of  discrimination continues to define the empirical research eff()rl. The results 
of this eiTort to date show, moreover, that the Basic Becker Hypothesis is still the place \vbere 
researchers must start when attempting to explain patterns of racial discrimination in the 
workplace. Analysts \Vho have conducted single-industt)' case studies have found, in general, 
strong support for the Basic Becker Hypothesis. When the level of competition increases in an 
industry (e.g., in  the aftermath of Deregulation), then employment opportunities for minorities 
expand and racial \Vagc gaps s!u·ink. 
Multi-industry studies have led researchers to develop a more nuanced, context-specific 
vicv"' of the Basic Becker Hypothesis: the actual relationship  between product market structure 
and racial discrimination i n  the workplace is  more complex and multi- Caceted than Becker's 
theory suggests. Product market concentration does appear to i nfluence both racial employment 
patterns and racial wage gaps across U .S .  industry. But other features of the labor-market 
context also matter, such as unionization, job-skill level, and black labor-supp�y constraints at 
higher skill levels. 
These results lead d i rectly to two points of concern for the future. f irst, the decline of 
unionization in  the U.S.  is hurting black workers, especially those in low-ski 11 and medium-ski l l  
occupations. As union membership continues to decline, more and more low- and medium-ski l l  
black \Vorkers wil l  likely become victims of employers in  concentrated industries who seck to 
exercise a preference for racial discrimination. Second, if it  is the case that high-skill black 
workers are being protected from d iscrimination by their limited avai lability, then increased 
access to advanced education and training may, paradoxically, expose these workers to more 
discrimination in the workplace. This may require more, not less, vigilance with respect to 
Affirmative Action issues in the future. 
FinaHy, where should the research eff01t go from here? I offer two suggestions. First, it 
is time (if possible) to take this effort into the services sector. ·rhe mnjor studies done to date 
have focused on U.S.  manufacturinQ, or on the industrial sector as a whole. But the vast bulk or 
employment in the economy is now, of course, in services. It will be interesting to uncover the 
extent to which Employment Discrimination and Earnings Discrimination exist i n  this sector. 
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W i l l  the Basic Becker Hypothesis and its ski l l -based extension explain the racial employment 
patterns and racial wage gaps that do exist in services? What other features of the services-sector 
labor market influence the relationship between product market structure and racial 
discrimination? 
Second, future research could attempt to focus on the principal-agent nature of Becker's 
original form ulation. What i s  the connection between the racial composition of firm ownership 
and racial discrimination i n  the workplace? Are racial wage gaps and racial employment patterns 
different (as most would suspect) in black-owned firms than in white-owned firms? Is there a 
separate, unique effect of white ownership on the relationship between product market 
concentration and racial discrimination in the workplace? Tackling these questions across the 
entire economy, of course, may not be possible. But there just might be enough i n formation 
available on the small-business sector and/or the self-employment component of our economy to 
get started. Maybe now i s  a good time to find out. 
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